The Iranian citizen Ahmad al-Baldi and Tunisia’s Mohamed Bouazizi share many commonalities that neither the vast distance, nor the complex differences of the two countries’ political dynamics, nor borders, nor their ideological, ethnic, or linguistic differences can erase.
The two young men, despite having never met, are brought together by oppression. This oppression weighed on their daily lives and stifled their freedom, and it drove both to commit an act of violence that harmed no one but themselves- an act of deliberate self-punishment to protest a seemingly individual problem of universal substance. In both cases, the men conveyed two sentiments: helplessness and protest.
Their action was an explicit admission of helplessness. However, this helplessness is not merely the result of a personal defect or particular circumstances. A broad downward trajectory in the country’s conditions as a whole led to it- decline the state bears responsibility for. It was also a desperate form of protest against the state or its direct representatives.
The two cases are evidently identical: in form, substance, and the dangerous message they sent, and it is neither incidental nor exceptional. The matchstick with which Bouazizi self-immolated sparked wildfires that went beyond Tunisia’s borders. The protest sparked by Ahmad al-Baldi in Ahvaz, in southwestern Iran, could similarly spread across Iran if the state does not address the problem and ensure Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian does not find himself echoing the famous statement of former Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali: “Now I understand you.”
Pezeshkian understands the scale of the domestic threats his country is facing: drought in the capital Tehran and other regions, high unemployment and inflation, corruption, futile regional projects, severe international sanctions, the blows of the recent war, and the specter of renewed direct military confrontation with Tel Aviv.
All these risks weigh heavily on the Iranian people; their patience is running very thin. In Pezeshkian’s view, the hardships Iranians face are not the fault of his government alone. He explicitly made this argument to Iran’s parliament: “I bear responsibility for my sins, but not all sins are mine alone… other institutions and bodies must also acknowledge their mistakes.”
In a speech he delivered before parliament last Tuesday, Pezeshkian spoke to his audience directly: “We cannot govern as the people go hungry,” sounding the alarm about living conditions. This candid warning is underpinned by figures and polling that reflect the magnitude of the multipronged crisis Iran is facing. An ISPA (Iranian Student Polling Agency) poll commissioned by his administration found that roughly 92 percent of the public is discontent.
For Pezeshkian, his team, and the reformist and moderate political elite that supports him, public trust in the state has declined, and improving living conditions will prove difficult without serious reform.
It is clear that the real domestic solution for Iran begins with genuine reform that addresses both form and substance. It needs something like an Iranian “Perestroika,” not necessarily in the Soviet mold, but the early symptoms of aging afflicting the 1979 regime do not differ much from the domestic crises that the Soviets had been confronting when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. For the elites of the Islamic Republic, this kind of reform process presents a huge risk: once they begin, the reforms could lead to more fundamental shifts and reshape the structure and nature of the regime.
Amid the struggle between the two models, an Iranian “Perestroika” that loosens some social restrictions without feeding the citizens and the self-immolation of Ahmad al-Baldi that could spark nationwide wildfires, just as Bouazizi had done… Can a third option emerge, or are these the only two paths available to Iran?