The elites of the Iranian regime have succeeded in absorbing the first blow, averting a vacuum in decision-making. Their rapid absorption of the shock has enabled them to maintain control and brought hardliners who had long operated in the shadows, its most radical military and political figures, into the fore. This has radically transformed the hierarchy, especially within the military apparatus, with “iron curtain” generals rising to the top.
This new configuration was shaped by the pairing of General Ahmad Vahidi at the top of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and his close associate General Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, who leads the Supreme National Security Council. This duo, alongside radicals within the Supreme Leader’s inner circle, was probably behind the decision to appoint Mojtaba Khamenei as the successor of his father as supreme leader. Decision-making mechanisms were transformed rapidly and opaquely under the pressure of an assault that had itself been the pretext for implementing them.
Confrontation, or “standing up to aggression,” has effectively become the regime’s source of legitimacy. In fact, it now underpins the legality of religious, military, and political elites of the same ideological factions and has allowed them to impose absolute control. Their shared affiliation, or rather the exclusive hold of their camp, has allowed the men leading Iran to present themselves as a unified and cohesive unit capable of absorbing the losses of the initial strike and overcoming its harsh repercussions for both the individuals and institutions making decisions. It has created the impression that Iran’s political system was never dependent on individuals, but beneath the surface, it continues to carry the burden of potentially combustible contradictions.
Grounded in ambiguity and steadfastness, Iran’s home front has adopted a framework of several dual structures within the IRGC, including the Vahidi-Zolqadr duo and the IRGC-Supreme Leader’s Office duo. The latter provided religious legitimacy through the election of the supreme leader, whose obscurity has itself been strategically leveraged both domestically and abroad. He is presented as the ultimate authority who has the final say on decisions, an arrangement that has allowed Vahidi, his generals, and the radical faction of the Supreme Leader’s Office to manage its military and political confrontations with Washington.
The dilemma facing this hardline and relatively cohesive power structure is that it draws its legitimacy from the conflict, which has transformed executive power into a military operations room led by generals who do not believe in diplomacy. They are obstructing negotiations and refusing to show any flexibility regarding their red lines, especially what they consider “Iranian nuclear pride,” Iran’s geopolitical position, and its imperial legacy. These ambitions align with their expansionist aspirations, which they regard as a pillar of their revolutionary legitimacy.
It has become clear that drawing from confronting foreign powers is a domestic burden. Although this ruling elite leverages this legitimacy to dominate the domestic sphere, it remains wary of the threats that any settlement with the outside world could create at home. Legitimacy grounded in a settlement is fundamentally different from the legitimacy of confrontation. The latter merely requires willingness to fight on, and that is already the case. On the other hand, it has none of the requisite settlement of this scale with the current military balance of power with Washington and the domestic political balance.
The “third Supreme Leader” is not truly present and his strategic absence, as the regime sees it, denies him the authority to make decisive decisions that his predecessors had possessed. Moreover, the current ruling elite cannot provide political cover for such decisions.
These challenges are compounded by the profound transformations unfolding within Iranian society itself. Iran is a divided country whose society is more politically and socially advanced than this ruling elite, and it understands that the elites are in position of weaknesses, avoiding clashing with them for now because they are equally aware of its brutality.
More dangerously still, the prospects for a settlement with this elite are slim. Washington is not in a position to offer even limited gains that could help the Iranian leadership make concessions, nor is the Iranian elite in a position to reach a difficult settlement. What Washington is offering is a poison chalice, and no one knows who will drink it nor the severity of its consequences. Meanwhile, the regime does not have the national antidote for this poison that its founding supreme leader had possessed.
The danger of reaching a settlement stems from the ruling elite’s lack of legitimacy to reach such a settlement. The big question in Iran remains what comes after signing an agreement. Once such an agreement is concluded, its legitimacy would come under scrutiny from all sides, leaving the current rulers to confront its domestic contradictions. Accordingly, the regime faces a difficult challenge: either permanent confrontation or a painful settlement. For General Vahidi and his brothers-in-arms, both options amount to a massacre.
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